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REDEFINING THE SUPREME COURT'S ROLE: A THEORY OF MANAG-
ING THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL PROCESS. By Samuel Estreicher and 
John Sexton. New Haven: Yale University Press. 1986. Pp. x, 201. 
$20. 
Observers of the United States Supreme Court have noted for some 
time the immensity of the Court's workload and the burgeoning 
number of cases and petitions it faces each term. 1 The justices them-
selves have made public comments on the Court's heavy case load.2 
Indeed, the Court does face a staggeringly large number of cases: in 
the 1986-1987 term, for example, the Court's docket included 5,123 
cases,3 up from 937 in 1934 and 1,940 in 1960.4 
One commonly suggested response to the crisis - or potential cri-
sis5 - is that Congress, pursuant to its article III power, establish an 
intermediate court of appeals, situated between the current circuit 
courts and the Supreme Court. 6 The proposals have included creation 
of a National Court of Appeals (NCA) that would screen certiorari 
1. See, e.g., Baker & McFarland, The Need for a New National Court, 100 HARV. L. REV. 
1400 (1987); Rx for an Overburdened Supreme Court: Is Relief in Sight?, 66 JUDICATURE 394 
(1983) (panel discussion); Griswold, Rationing Justice - The Supreme Court's Caseload and 
What the Court Does Not Do, 60 CORNELL L. REV. 335 (1975). 
2. See, e.g., w. BURGER, 1984 YEAR-END REPORT ON THE JUDICIARY 6 ("Supreme Court 
Justices must now work beyond any sound maximum limits."); Brennan, Some Thoughts on the 
Supreme Court's Workload, 66 JUDICATURE 230 (1983); White, Challenges for the U.S. Supreme 
Court and the Bar: Contemporary Reflections, 51 ANTITRUST L.J. 275 (1982). 
3. Statistical Recap of Supreme Court's Workload During Last Three Terms, 56 U.S.L.W. 
3102 (Aug. 11, 1987). 
4. R. POSNER, THE FEDERAL CoURTS 62 (1985). 
5. Most observers have discussed the case load situation with some degree of concern for its 
effects on the quality of the Court's work product. Professor Strauss, for example, suggests that 
it has forced the Court to issue opinions that focus more on explicating doctrine than on resolv-
ing the dispute at bar. This "challenges widely accepted models of and justifications for judicial 
decision." Strauss, One Hundred Fifty Cases Per Year: Some Implications of the Supreme 
Court's Limited Resources for Judicial Review of Agency Action, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 1093, 1095 
(1987). 
6. Article III states: "The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme 
Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish." 
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. 
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petitions and resolve intercircuit confiicts7 and an NCA that would 
hear only cases referred to it by the Supreme Court. 8 
In response to these proposals, Professors Samuel Estreicher9 and 
John Sexton10 in 1983 undertook a large-scale study of the Court's 
docket, with an eye toward evaluating the NCA concept {p. ix). This 
book, a summary of the study results as published in complete form in 
the New York University Law Review, 11 is a brief but thorough and 
persuasive discussion of the authors' main conclusions, most notably 
their view that the Court poorly manages its docket and needs to alter 
fundamentally its vision of its role in the federal judicial system. 
After studying in great depth all the cases that the Court agreed to 
hear, and all "paid" cases it refused to hear, from the 1982 Term,12 the 
authors (with the assistance of the N. Y. U. Law Review staff) found 
that the Court is wasting its time hearing and deciding the wrong 
cases. Specifically, they concluded: 
• Almost one-fourth of the cases the Court heard "had no legitimate 
claim on the Court's time and resources." 
• More than one-half of the cases heard were discretionary. 
• The Court denied review in an insignificant number of cases - less 
than one percent of the time - where review would have been proper. 
[p. 6] 
These are serious claims that, if true, carry serious implications for 
the purportedly "overburdened" Court. If Estreicher and Sexton's 
analysis is correct, the Court's overwork crisis is illusory; the justices 
need only revise their way of operating and the excess case burden will 
disappear. The authors' claims emerge from their fundamental as-
sumptions about the Court's role in the federal judicial system, as-
7. This proposal was made by the so-called Freund Committee. See Federal Judicial Center, 
Report of the Study Group on the Caseload of the Supreme Court, 51 F.R.D. 573 (1972). Chief 
Justice Burger appointed the committee in 1971. 
8. The Hruska Commission, created by Congress in 1972, made this proposal following its 
study of the federal courts. For its report, see Commission on Revision of the Federal Court 
Appellate System, Structure and Internal Procedures: Recommendations for Change, 61 F.R.D. 
195 (1975). 
The predominant view appears still to be in favor of some additional institutional layer in the 
federal courts. See, e.g., Baker & McFarland, supra note 1 (arguing for an Intercircuit Panel to 
unify national law). But cf. Ginsburg & Huber, The Intercircuit Committee, 100 HARV. L. REV. 
1417, 1435 (1987) ("No second national court is needed to assist the Supreme Court in doing 
better what it already does quite well and often enough."). 
9. Professor of Law, New York University Law School. B.A. 1970, J.D. 1975, Columbia 
University, M.S. 1974, Cornell University. 
10. Professor of Law, New York University Law School. B.A. 1963, M.A. 1965, Ph.D. 
1978, Fordham University, J.D. 1979, Harvard Law School. Both Professor Estreicher and Pro-
fessor Sexton are former Supreme Court clerks, Estreicher for Justice Powell and Sexton for 
Chief Justice Burger. 
11. New York University Supreme Court Project, 59 N.Y.U. L. REV. 677-1929 (1984). 
12. The study therefore analyzed a total of 2061 cases. P. 76. The Court's docket is about 
evenly split between cases that are "paid," and those that are "in forma pauperis," for which 
costs are waived. A handful of cases arise under the Court's original jurisdiction. See 56 
U.S.L.W. at 3102. 
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sumptions they illustrate through a proposed set of specific and 
limiting criteria for case selection. 
The authors challenge what they term "the popular view" of the 
Court, the view that the Court should be "ever ready to correct the 
errors of subordinate courts and ensure a just result in each case" (p. 
1). They argue instead that the Court's mission should be "to manage 
the process of national lawmaking," and not "to search for interesting 
(or even 'important') questions" (p. 6). Under this proposed "manage-
rial" theory, the Court would not view itself as a corrector of lower-
court error or as a last refuge for frustrated litigants. 13 Rather, the 
Court would "accord a presumption of regularity and validity to the 
decisions of state and lower federal courts," and intervene only "when 
some structural signal (such as a persistent conflict between subordi-
nates) indicated a problem requiring correction" (p. 50). The authors 
explain: "A wise manager delegates responsibilities to subordinates 
and, when there is no indication that something is awry, does not in-
tervene. To do otherwise is to denigrate the authority of subordinate 
actors" (p. 50). 
As part of this managerial function, Estreicher and Sexton argue, 
the Court should adopt a set of well-defined, specific criteria for select-
ing cases, thereby moving away from the ambiguity of Supreme Court 
Rule 17, the current guideline.14 The initial step would be to divide 
the Court's docket into three distinct categories: the priority docket 
(cases the Court should or must hear), the discretionary docket (cases 
it may hear), and the improvident grants (cases where review is inap-
propriate) (pp. 44-45). 
The priority docket would consist of cases that "press for immedi-
ate . . . review" (p. 52), not necessarily cases that present the most 
important or controversial issues. For example, a pressing case would 
require the Court to resolve an "intolerable" conflict among the fed-
eral appellate courts (p. 53). Disputing the notion that any conflict 
among the circuits requires Supreme Court attention, the authors ar-
gue that only "when litigants are able to exploit conflicts affirmatively 
through forum shopping or when planning is thwarted by the absence 
of a nationally binding rule" (p. 57) should the Court step into the fray 
and provide its own interpretation. The other priority situations pres-
ent similar "conflicts," some within the judicial branch, and some be-
13. For example, they state in conclusion that the Court "must be demythologized. We no 
longer have a national court of errors ready to right any wrong committed by a lower court in a 
federal case. • . . It is not the Supreme Court's job to ensure justice in the particular case." Pp. 
135-36. 
14. Rule 17 states, in part, that "[a] review on writ of certiorari is not a matter of right, but of 
judicial discretion, and will be granted only when there are special and important reasons there-
for." SUP. Cr. R. 17. Rule 17 does go on to list some criteria that the justices will take into 
consideration, but cautions that the criteria are "neither controlling nor fully measuring the 
Court's discretion." Id. 
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tween various branches or levels of government, such as an interstate 
dispute (pp. 59-62). 
Cases grouped under the discretionary docket tend to be those that 
present "important," but not necessarily crucial issues. Many of the 
cases that fall within these suggested certiorari criteria involve situa-
tions of "plainly erroneous" decisions by federal appeals courts or 
state supreme courts, often in cases that involve relations among the 
various levels of government, such as "vertical federalism" disputes. 15 
The authors explicate this category by example, listing kinds of cases 
that, consistent with the managerial theory, the Court may properly 
hear, but which are subordinate to "priority" cases.16 
The improvident grant category encompasses the remainder of 
cases, and consists of little more than cases that do not fall into one of 
the previous two groups (pp. 69-70). Throughout the book, the au-
thors stress the importance of what they term "percolation": the vari-
ous initial efforts by state and lower federal courts at resolving novel 
and difficult legal questions prior to ultimate resolution by the 
Supreme Court (p. 48). Most improvident grants occur when the 
Court has not allowed sufficient percolation of an issue, as in the case 
of a conflict between only two circuits that poses no problems of forum 
shopping (p. 69). The authors note one improvident grant case17 in 
which the granted certiorari petition could point only to one unap-
pealed district court case conflicting with the Eleventh Circuit case at 
bar. Although the authors believe that the issue presented was "surely 
one of national significance," and the decision below "palpably incor-
rect," they claim that the Court should have awaited fuller percolation 
instead of simply correcting error in the isolated instance. 18 
The apparent simplicity of the authors' argument - their view es-
sentially is that the Court can reduce its workload by hearing fewer 
cases - should not lead one to mistake the importance of their analy-
sis. Although the book purports to be only an evaluation of proposals 
for an additional layer of the federal courts (p. 71), the authors do 
15. A "vertical federalism" dispute involves a conflict of state.federal relations. P. 63. How-
ever, "profound" vertical federalism disputes - federal court invalidation of state or local stat-
utes, and state invalidation of federal statutes - are assigned to the priority docket. Pp. 60·61. 
16. Some examples of discretionary docket cases include those where the Court is suspicious 
of a state court's treatment of a federal question, resolution of a national emergency, and cases 
that require an exercise of the Court's "extraordinary power of supervision." Pp. 62-69. 
17. Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, reversing 678 F.2d 1022 (11th Cir. 1982). The 
case presented the issue of whether the ban on sex discrimination in employment contained in 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 applies to law firm partnership decisions. 
18. P. 95. Professor Strauss argues that, at least in the administrative law area, the Court is 
too tolerant of circuit conflicts: 
[T]he Court's awareness how frequently it is able to review lower court decisions has led it 
to be tolerant, even approving, of lower court and party indiscipline in relation to existing 
law. . . . The result puts added stress on some ideas about obedience to law and on the 
uniformity of national law administration. 
Strauss, supra note 5, at 1095. 
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concede that the implications of their study "radiate well beyond" 
those proposals (p. 128). Indeed, their proposals embody many spe-
cific assumptions about what types of "structural" issues are impor-
tant enough to warrant Supreme Court review. For example, one 
criticism the authors anticipate is that their criteria fail to afford ade-
quate protection for individual constitutional litigants (p. 72). They 
respond, in part, that they "find no compelling need to disturb the 
presumption of regularity [of a lower court decision] simply because a 
constitutional question is involved," adding that they "reject the no-
tion that constitutional cases are necessarily more important than 
other kinds of cases."19 That appears inconsistent with the authors' 
placing of some constitutional cases in the priority docket, such as a 
federal court's invalidation of a state statute, while similar cases, such 
as a federal court's striking down of a nonstatutory state action on 
constitutional grounds, are at best candidates for discretionary review, 
perhaps even improvident grants.20 This distinction between invalida-
tion of a statutory action and a nonstatutory one risks placing form 
over substance. Surely the interests of the particular litigants are the 
same in either case. 
Additionally, the authors would include in the discretionary 
docket cases that would serve as "vehicles for advances in the develop-
ment of federal law" (p. 65). Presumably, the justices already view 
most cases they hear as presenting such an opportunity. Moreover, 
the thrust of the authors' argument calls for a move away from the 
indeterminacy of certiorari grants issued solely to "advance" federal 
law. The authors attempt to escape any possible contradiction by list-
ing very specific instances of these discretionary grants (pp. 65-69), but 
the instances they cite may be so refined and specific as to be 
unworkable. 
In addition to the case selection criteria, the authors advocate a 
number of innovations in the Court's internal processes: ending 
mandatory appellate jurisdiction (p. 117); adopting a requirement that 
litigants certify that a case warrants Supreme Court review under the 
selection criteria (p. 119); and, most interestingly, implementing a 
"second look" mechanism (p. 120). Under this last procedure, the jus-
tices would take an initial unrecorded vote on certiorari petitions, sub-
mitting any cases that receive the requisite four positive votes to an 
independent staff for evaluation. The staff would issue an advisory 
report recommending a grant or denial of the petition, and would then 
19. P. 73. This position stems largely from the authors' view that the Supreme Court long 
ago ceased to be a court of last resort for individual litigants. See, e.g., pp. 1-2. 
20. P. 73. A federal court's rejection of constitutional claims likewise is not placed in the 
priority docket, unless it conflicts with Supreme Court precedent or creates an intolerable circuit 
split. Pp. 72-73. 
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submit the case to the justices for reconsideration.21 
If, as the authors argue, much of the Supreme Court's overwork 
problem is traceable to the false perception that the Court is a tribunal 
of last resort, eager to dispense individual justice, then surely the au-
thors are correct in suggesting that the Court require litigants to cer-
tify that a case warrants Supreme Court review under the selection 
criteria. Perhaps an amendment to the Supreme Court Rules would 
serve to implement those guidelines. Regardless, an affirmative state-
ment from the Court of its approach - whether it followed all, some, 
or none of this study's recommendations - would greatly help the 
legal community to adjust to the Court's own view of its role in the 
system, whatever that might be. 22 
Without such a statement from the Court, however, the ultimate 
value of this study may be difficult to gauge, since so many of the 
recommended changes involve the internal workings of the Court and 
the subjective perceptions of the several justices. Justice Stevens, for 
his part, has called the study "an unusually perceptive study of this 
Court's docket,"23 but there is, as yet, no indication that the Court as 
a whole is moving toward any of the study's recommendations. Per-
haps, as suggested by Judge Ruth Bader Ginsburg of the United States 
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, the imminent 
changes in the Supreme Court's membership will afford greater oppor-
tunities for the justices themselves to rethink the Court's role along the 
lines the study proposes. 24 
The real value of this study lies not in the particulars of what cases 
would or would not be heard, but in its attempt to revisit the unspoken 
assumptions that drive the various NCA proposals. Although the au-
thors state that their goal is merely to stimulate debate - as they put 
it, to "invite others into the thicket" (p. 75) - the study accomplishes 
much more. Professors Estreicher and Sexton's provocative analysis 
not only can aid the Court in relieving its heavy case load, but can be a 
foundational prescription of the proper function of the Court, in the 
21. P. 121. The independent staff would be "of the caliber of the Justices' clerks," and would 
be led by "a leading member of the Supreme Court bar." P. 120. 
Professors Baker and McFarland characterize this "second-look" proposal as "bizarre." 
Baker & McFarland, supra note 1, at 1411. 
22. The authors may implicitly recognize this point when they argue that the vagueness of 
Rule 17 serves as one cause of overgranting. Pp. 106-08. 
23. California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 398 (1985) (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens 
cited the study, then unpublished, in its New York University Law Review form. See note 11 
supra. 
24. "Propitiously timed to coincide with changes in the Court's composition, the work 
should promote constructive discussion of the Court's core role and attendant responsibilities" 
(book jacket). 
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hope of improving the administration and quality of federal justice at 
its highest level. 
- Robert S. Whitman 
